

Pages 1 through 3 redacted for the following reasons:

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Meeting between General Abizaid and Kurd Leaders, 1 August 2003, at Mosul Iraq  
(Headquarters, 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division).

Principals (seated in a square from General Abizaid's right): (b)(6)  
(b)(6) RADM Robb, MG Renuart, Ambassador Litt, (b)(6) (PUK), b 6  
(b)(6) (PUK), Muhammad Tawfig (PUK), (b)(6) (CPA North), MG  
Petraeus, (b)(6) (KDP), (b)(6) (KDP), (b)(6) (KDP),  
Rowsh Shaways (KDP).

Others in attendance: BG Custer, (b)(6) (KDP), (b)(3), (b)(6)

Agenda/initial discussions: General Abizaid welcomed the leaders and told them that before the Coalition further internationalized the stability force in Iraq, he wanted to hear their views. He stated that he was working on two things: putting Iraqis forward in security (including Civil Defense Forces, Police, and New Iraqi Army) and internationalizing the force. He said that in the next six to twelve months he would like to bring in another coalition division. He asked if the leaders believed that Iraqi forces would be strong enough by January-March 2004 to maintain security with international forces. He also stated that there would be potential participation of a Turkish force, though not in the North, and stated that the Turkish force would rely on lines of communications that would run through Kurdistan. General Abizaid also stressed the importance of resolving the PKK/KADEK issue. He also asked for their view on the security situation in general and stated that he was confident based on the success of recent operations.

(b)(6) initial statement: He stated that the longer the 101<sup>st</sup> and 4ID stayed the better and cited the great work that the two divisions were doing. He understood, however, that they would have to be replaced eventually. He stated that security problems were localized (Sunni Heartland and Baghdad) and agreed that the Iraqi people must take responsibility for security. He stated that international forces would encounter problems if Iraqis did not assume greater responsibility. He indicated that the Kurds were in a position to help "West of the Tigris," but in Baghdad and elsewhere "others would have to help." He offered to prepare a written report on how Iraqis can participate more fully in security. He expressed sympathy for recent American combat losses and expressed frustration in being "powerless" to do anything to effect the situation. On internationalization he stated that it would be better if none of the regional countries participated because each of them have their "own agenda" in Iraq. On the PKK he advocated "open amnesty" and said that the current proposal was "too restrictive."

(b)(6) initial statement: He expressed desire to do something to stop US casualties. He stated that US forces should divest themselves of police duties in the cities and turn over law enforcement to Iraqis, then occupy bases outside of urban areas. He described the enemy as "terrorist groups."

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General Abizaid asked which cities are ready for Iraqis to assume security and (b)(6) suggested western Baghdad. General Abizaid responded that it takes time to build Iraqi security capacity and said it is difficult to find a place that is ready. (b)(6) suggested Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk and b 6 mentioned Baqubah, Kirkuk, and Mosul. He stated that they could work with "tribes other than Kurds" to improve security. b 6 suggested using tribal forces to secure the oil pipeline. (b)(6) stated that one of the largest Sunni tribes in Ar Ramadi could play a role in improving security there and suggested that he and (b)(6) approach that tribe jointly.

Both (b)(6) were concerned about border security and control along the Jordanian, Syrian, and Iranian borders. (b)(5) offered anecdotal evidence of foreign terrorists moving into Iraq unimpeded and characterized the Syrian border as "open." He mentioned Al Qaeda and Ansar al Islam. He stated that what was needed was an "anti-terrorist" effort along the border rather than a customs effort and (b)(6) expressed the need for a US military effort along the border. General Abizaid mentioned Jordanian efforts to control the border and (b)(6) mentioned the need for checkpoints along the main roads as a component of improving the security situation in Ar Ramadi. (b)(6) stated that none of Iraq's neighboring countries want the coalition effort to succeed and also stressed the need for border control.

General Abizaid said that we will have to assume risk at some point and turn over security responsibilities to Iraqis. General Petraeus mentioned that there were already many areas with no US presence.

General Abizaid mentioned the need for the Sunni community to take responsibility for security and develop a political alternative to the Baathists. (b)(6) responded that these groups already exist and mentioned that there were Sunni generals who assisted us during the war who have not been included in the post-war security efforts. (b)(6) suggested using the IGC to reach out to the Sunnis. (b)(6) referenced the British use of Assyrians in the 1920s and suggested that Iraqi Christians could be used in anti-terrorist security efforts. He stated that "they are neglected." (b)(6) expressed support for the Civil Defense Forces initiative.

General Abizaid mentioned the possibility of a security meeting for the Sunni community in the trouble areas of Baqubah, Mosul, Ar Ramadi, Fallujah, Bayji, etc. He suggested that Talibani and Barzani talk to the IGC and he talk with LTG Sanchez about it. It would be a security, not a political meeting.

(b)(6) characterized the nature of the opposition as "political" as well as military and (b)(6) stressed the foreign terrorist (i.e. Al, AQ) nature of the opposition. (b)(6) stressed the need for a Fetwah from a Sunni religious leader condemning the attacks on Coalition forces.

(b)(6) both stated that they had offered assistance in the past, but felt shut out. (b)(6) asked for "responsibility and means" to contribute to

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security. Both mentioned frozen Iraqi assets as a potential source of funds in that connection. (b)(6) mentioned that he was aware of sources of opposition in Baqubah and General Abizaid said "give us their names." MG Petraeus said indicated that they had a good mechanism for exchanging intelligence and General Abizaid said that the intelligence had to get to 4ID as well.

On the issue of Turkish forces, (b)(6) said that it was better for the Turks to "stay with their families." General Abizaid said that the President already made an offer to the Turks and that an agreement on a main supply route was needed. (b)(6) stated that it would have to be "very clearly defined... no expansion." (b)(6) stated that the "Turks would not help security." General Abizaid stated that he spoke with the Turks about a policy that would respect the sovereignty of all Iraq and that there was no place for the permanent stationing of Turkish forces in Northern Iraq. The PKK issue, however, had to be resolved. (b)(6) stated again that amnesty was the issue. He said that he would talk with the Turks about the PKK. (b)(6) stated that he "strongly believed that the involvement of neighbors will not help security because each have an agenda." He stated that it would be much better if Iraqis or other forces could do that job." (b)(6) asked that he be given a chance to work with "his Sunni Arab brothers" to improve security in the problem areas. General Abizaid stated that it would be desirable for an Islamic force to join in the security effort and suggested that the IGC invite the Pakistanis. (b)(6) said that he would take that issue to the IGC. General Abizaid then stated that there should be no misunderstanding about US-Turkish relations. He stated that there would be a free and independent Iraq and that the Turks would still be US allies.

General Abizaid stated that we will take this "one step at a time." Next actions should be first to work with the Sunnis to improve security and second to ask for Pakistani assistance.

There was brief discussion of Turkish activities in the North (training Turkomen). MG Petraeus then outlined his proposal on reconciliation for Baathist professors in Mosul (i.e. panel of Iraqis) as a potential model for resolving similar issues. (b)(6) suggested reducing the depth of the deBaathification policy. Finally there was a discussion of the need for economic reforms to break loose from the centrally-planned economy and set conditions for investment and economic growth.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

1 August 2003

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Notes on a conversation with a PL in the 1-327 AAslt in early August 2003.

The vision thing:

--Need senior leader (strategic) vision—What are we doing in Iraq, why is it important?

--Need to get the vision down to operational commanders—how does the overall vision break down into major operational objectives? What role does the Army play? What does success look like?

--Need to get operational commanders out of their TOCs and brief their CCs and PLs about why they're there, what's expected of them, how to go about accomplishing it.

How do tactical missions support the operational (and strategic) objectives. [Note from us: We've seen and heard this from participants in every single operation of the U.S. Army since the first Gulf War. The Army seems to be absolutely terrible about ensuring that the lowest levels actually understand how what they're doing fits into the big picture. If the senior leadership thinks it's doing this, it needs to reconsider and re-evaluate honestly.]

--Visits from Abizaid, Sanchez would be good—talk about how something the unit (like battalion or company ideally, or brigade at max) did directly supported the overall mission. This is not just a morale thing, but an educational thing. Help the unit understand what a successful tactical mission is and how it fits into the bigger picture—and why it matters.

--There's a lot of running around "just making things better," without any clear aim or even understanding of what "better" means. In the absence of vision, there is a lot of movement for the sake of movement. E.g.: go build schools; improve MWR, etc. These are good things, but if they're not coordinated, they may be a waste of effort and resources (there seems to be a pressure to expend resources simply to show that they were expended, whether or not anything was actually accomplished).

--Short-term syndrome created a lot of problems; the units did not feel they had a stake in really starting long-term projects and thinking through what should happen because they did not expect to be there very long; that will change, but not necessarily for the better unless clear operational objectives are established

--In other words, we seem to have had a major breakdown at the operational level. Strategic objectives are not making their way down to the soldiers. There's an abstract notion that we're trying to make democracy and peace in Iraq, but if that objective has been broken down into meaningful operational goals, they have not reached the lowest levels of the organization (at least in this unit).

--This unit was unaware of any coordination with the CPA at all, and had no understanding of how its actions fit in, or were supposed to fit in, with any vision that came from the CPA.

--No AARs of the warfighting above PL level were conducted in this unit; it does not sound as though any AARs are being conducted during this (peacekeeping) phase of the operation.

--The 101<sup>st</sup> seems to be badly configured for these sorts of (peacekeeping) operations. Engineer assets seem to be inadequate and there was little to no CA activity in this area. PL was frequently asked to intervene in issues regarding water supply, but had no expertise available in the unit. Could solve immediate water supply issues, but did not

understand how to help re-establish large-scale irrigation systems, etc. PL recommended striving to ensure that people with experience in operating utilities be incorporated in CA units and to work on coordinating CA activities at the level of battalions and below.

--There was no apparent NGO activity in the area as well; PL was surprised and disappointed.

--Unit had not trained for peacekeeping at all, had no SOPs and no clear idea how to transition.

--Discovered with annoyance that other units had know-how in peacekeeping operations, but only months into the operation. There should be transition books prepared for incoming units that identify obvious and common problems and suggest solutions. As an example, how do you pick interpreters? Do you want interpreters or translators? Unit initially had a great deal of difficulty because it had not considered the problem before (they've now developed what sounds like a good SOP—but will need to pass it on to their successors).

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